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RECENT DEVELOPMENT 
ROMAS v. STATE: EXPERT TESTIMONY ON EYEWITNESS 
IDENTIFICATION IS ADMISSIBLE IF THE EXPERT OFFERS 
REAL APPRECIABLE HELP TO THE TRIER OF FACT. 
By: Michael Tanner 
The Court of Appeals of Maryland held that the proper test for courts to use in evaluating the admissibility of expert testimony 
on eyewitness identification is whether the testimony will be of real 
appreciable help to the trier of fact in deciding the issue presented. 
Bomas v. State, 412 Md. 392, 987 A.2d 98 (2010). The court further 
held that the application of this test is largely within the discretion of 
the trial court, but that trial courts should take into account recent 
scientific advances in exercising their discretion. Id. at 416, 987 A.2d 
at 112. 
On April 18, 2004, off-duty detective Kenneth Bailey ("Bailey") 
witnessed a fatal shooting near the Tower Lounge bar in Baltimore 
City. As Bailey sat in traffic, he observed an individual shoot the 
victim and flee the scene, passing within a car's length of Bailey's 
truck. A week later, Bailey filed a report in which he described the 
shooter as "a black male." 
On October 14, 2004, police arrested Jimmy Dower ("Dower") on 
drug charges. Dower offered to provide the police with information as 
to the identity of the shooter at the Tower Lounge. He claimed to have 
witnessed the killing as well as the argument that led up to it. Dower 
identified the shooter as Henry Low a/k/a Tavon Bomas ("Bomas"). 
On October 26, 2004, police showed Dower a photo array from which 
he identified Bomas as the killer. The other eyewitness, Bailey, also 
identified Bomas' picture from the array. Based on the identifications 
by Bailey and Dower, police arrested Bomas and charged him with 
murder. 
At a pre-trial hearing and at trial, Dower retracted his identification 
of Bomas, claiming that he did not want to be a "snitcher." In an 
attempt to discredit Bailey's eyewitness account, Bomas proffered 
testimony from David Schretlen, Ph.D. ("Dr. Schretlen"), an expert in 
neuropsychology. Dr. Schretlen testified that: (1) a "trained observer" 
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has no more capacity to remember faces than a layperson; (2) a 
witness' confidence in an identification does not correlate with the 
accuracy of that identification; (3) memory is affected by stress and 
time; (4) photo arrays can influence identifications; and (5) even 
effective cross-examination does not lead juries to disbelieve 
eyewitness testimony. The motions judge declined to admit Dr. 
Schretlen's testimony on the grounds that it would be unhelpful to the 
jury and that the jury was able to weigh eyewitness testimony without 
expert guidance. 
Bomas was subsequ~ntly convicted in the Circuit Court for 
Baltimore City of second-degree murder and the use of a handgun 
during the commission of a crime of violence or felony. Bomas 
appealed the judgment to the Court of Special Appeals of Maryland on 
the grounds that the trial court abused its discretion by refusing to 
admit Dr. Schretlen's testimony. The Court of Special Appeals of 
Maryland affirmed. Bomas then filed a petition for writ of certiorari 
in the Court of Appeals of Maryland, which the court granted. 
The Court of Appeals of Maryland considered two questions: (1) 
whether the standard for the admissibility of expert testimony on 
eyewitness identification adopted in Bloodsworth v. State should be 
reconsidered; and (2) whether the trial court abused its discretion in 
finding that Dr. Schretlen's testimony would not be helpful. Bornas, 
412 Md. at 403,987 A.2d at 104 (citing Bloodsworth v. State, 307 Md. 
164, 512 A.2d 1056 (1986)). The standard set forth in Bloodsworth 
for the admissibility of expert testimony on eyewitness reliability is 
whether the testimony will be of "real appreciable help" to the trier of 
fact, a standard that the trial court has wide discretion in applying. Id. 
at 406,987 A.2d at 106, (citing Bloodsworth, 307 Md. at 184-85, 512 
A.2d at 1066-67). The court in Bloodsworth criticized expert 
testimony on eyewitness identification, suggesting that a flood of such 
testimony would "invade the province of the jury" and noting that a 
majority of jurisdictions at the time had rejected expert testimony on 
eyewitness identification. Id. at 409, 987 A.2d at 108 (quoting 
Bloodsworth, 307 Md. at 181-83, 512 A.2d at 1064-65). 
The Court of Appeals of Maryland re-examined the Bloodsworth 
standard in light of recent advances in the science of memory, a trend 
towards admission of expert witnesses on eyewitness identification in 
other jurisdictions, and disturbing statistics arising from post-
conviction DNA testing. Id. at 411, 416, 987 A.2d at 109, 112. The 
court noted that, although most jurisdictions have abandoned a blanket 
exclusion of expert testimony on eyewitness identification, few have 
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gone so far as to create a presumption of admissibility. Id. at 411-12, 
418 n.13, 987 A.2d at 109, 113 n.13 (citing United States v. Smithers, 
212 F.3d 306, 311-12 (6th Cir. 2000); State v. Copeland, 226 S.W.3d 
287,299-301 (Tenn. 2007». The court recognized studies finding that 
a majority of inmates exonerated by DNA evidence, including Kirk 
Bloodsworth, were convicted based, in part, upon mistaken eyewitness 
identifications. Id. at 410-11,987 A.2d at 108-10 (citing United States 
v. Brownlee, 454 F.3d 131, 141-42 (3d Cir. 2006); The Innocence 
Project, Know the Cases: Kirk Bloodsworth, 
http://www.innocenceproject.org/Content/54.php (last visited Jan. 04 
2010». 
Based 'upon these considerations, the court evaluated the test 
announced in Bloodsworth separately from the tone of the opinion in 
that case. Bomas, 412 Md. at 416, 987 A.2d at 112. The court held 
that the test set forth in Bloodsworth is correct, and that it comports 
with the general rule of admissibility of expert testimony set forth in 
Maryland Rule 5-702. Id. Though the court upheld the central 
holding of Bloodsworth, it was critical of the negative tone of the 
decision, and it stated that a trial court should take into account 
scientific advances when exercising its discretion in deciding whether 
to admit expert testimony. Id. 
The Court of Appeals of Maryland, having reiterated the standard 
by which courts should evaluate the admissibility of expert testimony 
on eyewitness identification, held that the trial court properly applied 
this standard and was not influenced by the negative tone of the 
Bloodsworth opinion. Id. at 410, 987 A.2d at 108. The court 
examined the testimony proffered by Dr. Schretlen and found it 
"general, vague, and inconclusive," and that, on each point, the 
testimony would either offer no appreciable help to the jury or would 
be confusing to the jury. Id. at 420, 987 A.2d at 114. The Court of 
Appeals of Maryland held that the trial court was entitled to find that 
each element of the testimony either "( 1) lacked adequate citation to 
studies or data, (2) insufficiently related to the identifications at issue, 
and/or (3) addressed concepts that were not beyond the ken of 
laypersons." Id. at 423,987 A.2d at 116. 
By reiterating the standard stated in Bloodsworth, the Court of 
Appeals of Maryland upheld the discretion of trial judges to decide 
issues of admissibility of expert testimony on eyewitness identification 
on a case-by-case basis. By acknowledging the negative tone of 
Bloodsworth and urging trial courts to recognize scientific advances in 
the field, the court emphasized that trial courts must carefully consider 
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the evidence proffered and its application to the facts in each particular 
case. Rather than relying upon general arguments as to the merits of 
expert testimony on eyewitness identification, Maryland practitioners 
proffering such testimony must be prepared to show that the testimony 
is scientifically grounded, that it relates directly to the circumstances 
of the identification at issue, and that the issues addressed by the 
testimony are beyond the knowledge of a layperson. 
